A v Disclosure and Barring Service [2026] UKUT 175 (AAC) (29 April 2026)

Executive summary

The Upper Tribunal dismissed A’s appeal against the Disclosure and Barring Service’s decision to place him on the Children’s Barred List under Schedule 3 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. It held that DBS made no mistake of fact in finding that A posed a risk to children and no error of law in its proportionality assessment, so the barring decision stood.

Key points

• Parties: A v Disclosure and Barring Service; appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber).
• Holding: appeal dismissed; DBS’s inclusion of A on the Children’s Barred List was upheld.
• Basis of barring: 2023 conviction under s.9(1) Sexual Offences Act 2003 for sexual activity with a 15-year-old former pupil in 2005.
• Reasoning: the Tribunal found no factual error in DBS’s risk assessment and no legal error in the proportionality/rationality of the decision.
• Procedure: A had made representations; DBS nevertheless concluded it was appropriate to include him on the barred list.
• No sanctions/export-control angle appears in the decision; the only sanction-like consequence discussed is statutory barring from regulated activity and contempt for breach of the anonymity order.

Why it matters

The case shows how a safeguarding barring decision can be sustained where a conviction and surrounding conduct support a continuing risk finding, even after a long passage of time. For compliance and risk teams, it illustrates the Tribunal’s limited review role: unless DBS has made a legal or factual mistake, the barring decision will generally stand.

Implications

For employers and compliance functions, the decision reinforces the need to treat DBS barring outcomes as high-confidence restrictions on regulated activity, not merely advisory findings. In litigation strategy, appellants must focus on identifiable errors of law or fact in the DBS record and reasoning; broad fairness or proportionality arguments will be hard to advance because the Tribunal cannot substitute its own view of appropriateness.