Houthi Force Disposition and the Saudi–Red Sea Front

Key judgments

Azimuth inference unless marked. Probabilities are Azimuth's subjective estimates for the period to 12 November 2026, recorded so they can be scored.

Forecast register (to 12 November 2026)

What best explains the escalation since July?

The Houthis stayed largely quiet from the 28 February strikes on Iran until July, apart from limited fire at Israel in March–April and June. They turned on Saudi Arabia the day after the government struck Sanaa's runway to stop the Tehran flight.

Analysis of competing hypotheses

+ consistent · – inconsistent · 0 not diagnostic. ACH ranks hypotheses by how much evidence contradicts them, not by how much supports them.

Assessment. No single hypothesis carries the evidence. H3 and H4 have no contradicting items, but H3 explains only the ground war and H4 has almost no diagnostic support. The best composite is a Saudi-precipitated trigger (H5) feeding Houthi coercion aims (H2) and a coastal grab (H3), with Iran as the capability provider (H1). The one item cutting against H5, that the offensive was planned months ahead, is a partisan claim. Confidence: medium. Discriminating test: if a Saudi–Houthi truce holds while the US–Iran war continues, H1 weakens; if Houthi tempo moves with the US–Iran track, H1 strengthens.

How the front reopened, 2026

1. 28 Feb

   US and Israel strike Iran; Ali Khamenei killed; Iran closes Hormuz. Mojtaba Khamenei named supreme leader on 8 Mar.

2. 28 Mar – 9 Jun

   Houthis fire at Israel on eight days; no damage reported. Two searches found no Israeli strikes on Yemen in 2026; absence is not proof.

3. 7–8 Apr · 17 Jun

   US–Iran ceasefire; Islamabad Memorandum.

4. 7–8 Jul

   US strikes 80, then 90 targets in Iran; Trump calls the ceasefire "over".

5. 12–13 Jul

   Government strikes Sanaa runway; Mahan Air flight diverts to Hodeidah, reportedly with 10–21 IRGC personnel and missile parts. Houthis fire at Abha airport.

6. 20 Jul

   Maritime blockade of Saudi ports declared.

7. 23 Jul

   Trump says the US will hold Iran responsible for further Houthi attacks on Saudi ships.

8. 30 Jul · 7 Aug

   Red Sea maritime alliance announced; Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed with Pakistan and Türkiye.

9. 30 Aug – 1 Sep

   US strikes Larak, then IRGC targets across southern Iran.

10. 10–11 Sep

    Houthis take Mocha within 36 hours, then Dhubab and Mayyun. Air support that a Yemeni commander says CENTCOM promised did not arrive.

11. Early Sep · 19–20 Sep

    100–200 US personnel in a new joint command support Saudi targeting; Trump twice declines strikes.

12. 5–6 Oct

    Saudi-backed counteroffensive; Mecca pact activated.

13. 9 Oct

    UN envoy tells the Security Council Yemen has "slid back into full-scale war".

14. 10 Oct

    Terminal 4 strike: 12 killed, 309 injured. Coalition promises a "firm response"; Rubio: "They must stop now."

15. 7 Oct

    Axios: Saudi Arabia and Syria discussing 10,000–20,000 Syrian troops for Yemen; a Syrian presidency adviser denies a request was made.

16. 11–12 Oct

    GACA confirms an attack on Dammam's King Fahd airport and a new attack on Riyadh's airport with injuries. Kataib Hezbollah tells the Saudi leadership via Press TV to "acknowledge the failure of the military option". No Saudi retaliation strike dated after 10 Oct found. Araghchi calls Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan late on 11 Oct and offers to help start Saudi–Houthi talks.

Strength, command and arsenal

Manpower

Command

Abdulmalik al-Houthi leads. Israel killed the Houthi prime minister and ministers in August 2025. Chief of staff Muhammad al-Ghamari's death was confirmed on 16 October 2025, and Maj. Gen. Yusuf Hassan Ismail al-Madani was named successor the same day. The 2026 campaign shows planning survived: CAR documents a time-sensitive ballistic launch cued by a surveillance drone.

Arsenal

At least ten missile types. Lineage follows USIP, current to late 2024, updated with the UN Panel of Experts (2025) and CAR (2026). This pass found no new systems unveiled in 2026; CAR reports experimentation with loitering torpedoes and hydrogen power.

Expenditure and reliability benchmarks

v1 charted inventory estimates against a partisan one-month count. Those measure different things, so they are tabled here instead.

Inference. The Israel campaign averaged about 10 ballistic missiles a month. The NRF's claim of 130 in one month on one front is 13 times that rate, which fits mostly short-range systems, an inflated claim or both. A 38% self-failure rate means a meaningful share of launches at Saudi Arabia need no interceptor.

Iranian support and the supply chain

Russia and China

China's role is commercial and documentary: many Panel-documented component shipments originated in China, US Treasury has designated Chinese chemical suppliers and freight forwarders, and in April 2025 the State Department said Chang Guang Satellite Technology supplied imagery used in Houthi attacks. Russia reportedly passed satellite targeting data via embedded IRGC personnel in 2024, per the Wall Street Journal's sources; there was no evidence of missile transfers. Gap: no 2026 evidence on either state's role against Saudi targets was found. China and Russia abstained on the November 2025 sanctions renewal.

Houthi finance and sanctions exposure

• Oil. Treasury says Iran sells oil to the Houthis and also gives a free monthly shipment through Iran-affiliated firms in Dubai. Its January 2026 action designated 21 persons across Yemen, Oman and the UAE, including Sanaa's Al-Ridhwan Exchange.
• Telecoms and currency. International call revenue runs about $20m a month. The Houthis enforce 500 rials to the dollar; the black-market rate in government areas exceeded 2,800.
• Banking. Banks are moving headquarters to Aden to comply with Central Bank of Yemen directives and US measures; the Yemeni Commercial Bank for Reconstruction and Development relocated in July 2025. The Houthis blame salary arrears on the central bank's move to Aden.
• Legal exposure. FTO designation since March 2025 creates material-support risk for anyone paying Houthi authorities, including port and fuel charges. The UN asset freeze and travel ban run to 14 November 2026; the Panel's mandate to 15 December 2026, with the Panel tasked to report on dual-use components and precursors.

Inference. Most of the base is taxation of a captive economy of roughly 23 million people, which interdiction cannot reach. Sanctions pressure bites on the oil and remittance channels running through UAE and Omani trading and exchange houses, the obvious targets for the next Treasury action.

Strikes on Saudi Arabia, July–October 2026

Confirmed by Saudi or UN authorities · Claim Houthi claim only · Iraq attributed to Iraq-based launch · Disputed

1. 13 Jul Confirmed

   Missiles at Abha airport, intercepted.

2. 22–28 Jul Confirmed

   UN confirms attacks on Encelia (22 Jul) and NCC Ghazal (28 Jul); JMIC logs a projectile 70 nm off the Saudi coast.

3. 25 Jul Confirmed

   A Greek Patriot battery at Yanbu intercepts missiles and a drone from Yemen aimed at a refinery; Aramco suspends the Jazan refinery.

4. 27 Jul Disputed

   Abqaiq fire: Riyadh blames Iraq-based militias; the Houthis claim it. US–Saudi strikes on PMF sites in Iraq follow.

5. 5 Aug Confirmed Disputed

   UN confirms the attack on Daisy. A separate uncrewed-boat sinking north of the strait matches no Houthi claim.

6. 9–16 Aug

   At least 60 missiles and drones on Mocha in four days, 18 killed; a ship at Mocha port hit, six killed.

7. 19 Aug Claim

   Saree's summary claims nine operations since 20 Jul on Yanbu, Najran, Jazan, Abha and "Eastern Province oil supplies". It is the only July–August claim on the Eastern Province, where Riyadh had blamed Iraq for Abqaiq.

8. 24 Aug Unattributed Claim

   Bahri VLCC hit about 63 nm west of Yanbu. The same day Saree claimed one ballistic missile on a tanker he named Amzan off Yanbu, which matches the UKMTO report.

9. 8 Sep Confirmed

   Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, Najran: 73 civilians wounded (coalition); Jazan oil facilities hit.

10. 11 Sep Iraq

    East–West pipeline struck and shut; launched from Maysan; Rubio blames Kataib Hezbollah, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denies.

11. 15 Sep Confirmed Disputed

    13 injured in Khamis Mushait, Abha, Taif; drone toward Mecca intercepted per Riyadh, denied by the Houthis.

12. 1 Oct Confirmed

    Two ballistic missiles and four drones intercepted over Khamis Mushait and Jazan.

13. 3 Oct Claim

    Saree claims ballistic missiles and drones on an Aramco site in Riyadh; Reuters and AFP report a smoke plume nearby. He puts Saudi strikes at 1,420 to date.

14. 6–8 Oct Confirmed

    Abha and Riyadh airports: 3 killed, 36 injured. Riyadh again on 8 Oct: 3 killed including a Saudia captain; 3 ballistic missiles intercepted. On 7 Oct two ballistic missiles and drones were also fired at Aden airport in government-held Yemen.

15. 10 Oct Confirmed

    Terminal 4: 13 killed (first reported as 12; incl. 1 US citizen), 309 injured. Coalition: "unidentified projectile"; a cruise missile intercepted nearby, a ballistic missile over Al-Kharj, a drone in the east.

16. 11 Oct Confirmed Claim

    GACA: Dammam's King Fahd airport targeted, damage being assessed. An unidentified projectile hits Riyadh's Terminal 4 again: 1 Pakistani killed, 11 injured; a cruise missile intercepted near the airport. Ballistic missile intercepted toward Al-Kharj, drone in the Eastern Province. Saree also claims Aramco's Shedgum gas plant and Tanajib oil facility; Riyadh has not confirmed either. NASA fire data show a thermal event at Shedgum, none at Tanajib.

17. 12 Oct Confirmed

    Ballistic missile toward Khamis Mushait intercepted early morning; the coalition reports drone and cruise-missile threats. Riyadh airport's suspension extended for safety inspections.

Strike log: what 32 events show

The log combines every Saudi coalition statement found in Arabic and English (via SPA, QNA and Saudi dailies), UN confirmations, and a sample of Houthi claims, from 13 July to 12 October. It is a sample, not a census: many coalition statements give no projectile count. Saudi disclosure was thin before September: this pass found five coalition statements for July and August, against 17 from September to 12 October.

• Reach. Houthi-attributed confirmed strikes stop at about 1,000 km (Yanbu, Riyadh, Medina). Abqaiq (1,173 km, disputed), the East–West pipeline (Iraq), Dammam airport (1,229 km, unattributed) and the Eastern Province drone are all beyond that line. Shedgum and Tanajib, claimed by the Houthis on 11 Oct, would be at 1,131 and 1,320 km. Satellite fire data show a large thermal event at Shedgum from late 9 Oct and nothing at Tanajib (see below). Shedgum is the first independent sign of a hit beyond the line with a Houthi claim attached.
• Counted intercepts. Statements that give numbers add up to 20 ballistic missiles, 10 drones and 2 cruise missiles. Roughly half of all statements give no count, so true volume is higher.
• Target mix by month. July: shipping and energy. August: shipping, Najran and Jazan. September: cities, Mecca, Taif and Yanbu. October: airports dominate, plus a Medina substation serving the Prophet's Mosque (1 Oct).
• Counts the coalition itself contradicts. On 24 Sep the spokesman reported six ballistic missiles destroyed, then told SPA only "some" were intercepted.
• Saudi counter-battery. The coalition reported destroying a ballistic launch platform in Sanaa and a missile store in Saada on 6 Oct.

Inference. Three readings fit the Eastern Province record. The Houthis have reached it but Riyadh has not said so; Iraq-based groups launched the attacks and the Houthis claim them; or both are active. The Shedgum fire signal makes "nothing happened" unlikely but does not choose between the three. For energy risk the readings converge: the Gulf-coast assets that matter most (Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Dammam, Shedgum) are now inside someone's demonstrated reach. Watch for Riyadh naming a launch point for the Dammam or Shedgum attacks.

Houthi claims against the record

Saree's channel carries 19 claims of strikes on Saudi territory between 13 July and 11 October. Each was checked against Saudi statements, UN reporting, wire reports and satellite fire data.

• Airports are confirmed, bases are not. All four claims against military targets alone (Sharurah, the Khamis Mushait air base, camps in Jazan and Asir) have no Saudi confirmation. Riyadh reports civilian harm and intercepts over cities, not damage to bases. "Unconfirmed" there means undisclosed, not false.
• Independent traces tend to support the event, not the detail. Reuters and AFP saw smoke near an Aramco site in Riyadh on 3 Oct; UKMTO logged a tanker hit off Yanbu on 24 Aug, matching the claim; FIRMS shows Shedgum burning. None of these confirms the weapon counts ("dozens of ballistic missiles"), which outrun every Saudi intercept tally.
• Claims that look weak. Tanajib (11 Oct) shows no fire signal. The tanker tally is inflated: the 19 Aug summary claims 8 tankers hit, against 4 confirmed by the UN or Riyadh and 1 matched to UKMTO.
• Shootdowns. The channel claims 14 drones downed since 14 July (6 Wing Loong II, 3 CH-4, 3 Karayel, 2 Bayraktar Akinci) and one F-15 over Marib on 16 Sep, credited to a "locally made" missile. None is confirmed by Riyadh. If even half are real, Chinese and Turkish drones, not Saudi jets, are carrying much of the strike war.

What satellites see

NASA FIRMS active-fire detections (VIIRS on NOAA-20 and Suomi NPP), 7-day window, 5–12 Oct, filtered by site box. Fire data capture large or lasting heat; a brief impact between overpasses can leave no trace. Interpretation is Azimuth's.

The other side of the ledger: casualties inside Yemen

No neutral casualty count exists for either side.

The second launch geography

Iran-aligned groups in Iraq have struck Saudi energy assets at least twice. Saudi Arabia said drones from Iraq hit oil facilities in July, and US and Saudi forces then struck PMF sites in Iraq, killing at least 20. After the 11 September pipeline strike, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government traced the launch to Maysan, removed the Maysan operations commander and police chief, and closed the Shalamcheh crossing with Iran. Rubio named Kataib Hezbollah; the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denied involvement.

Inference. Iraq-based groups have hit the higher-value energy targets (Abqaiq, the pipeline) while the Houthis concentrate on airports, the south and shipping. A division of labour fits H1 better than anything in the Yemen data alone. Baghdad's punitive steps make further Maysan launches costlier but do not rule out other provinces.

What Iranian officials and state media say

Graded as party sources. Useful for Tehran's positions and messaging, not for battlefield facts.

Inference. Tehran runs two registers, and v3.1 adds a third signal. Its government (Pezeshkian, Araghchi, Baghaei) speaks of distance and diplomacy, which keeps channels to Riyadh and Islamabad open. The Leader's circle and state media celebrate gains, publish target lists and give the Iraqi group linked to the pipeline strike a platform. Official denials are expected whether or not Iran directs the campaign, so they carry no weight in the hypothesis matrix. The publicity given to Kataib Hezbollah is more telling: it links the Iraqi and Yemeni fronts in Iranian messaging, which fits the division of labour seen in the strike record. The third signal is the negotiating text: by asking Washington to end the war "on all fronts", Tehran claims a say over the Yemen front while publicly denying any role in it. That is the strongest piece of evidence for H1 in this file, though it shows a bargaining claim rather than operational control.

Attribution flag. Houthi claims now include Eastern Province targets (Shedgum, Tanajib, Dammam) about 1,300–1,400 km from Saada, while the coalition reported intercepting a drone over the Eastern Province on 11 October. As with Abqaiq in July, Houthi claims may cover launches from Iraq. Treat Eastern Province strikes as unattributed until Riyadh names a launch point.

What the Houthi military spokesman says, in his own channel

From Yahya Saree's Telegram channel, read directly. 50 posts from 3 July to 11 October are coded in the attached CSV. Party source: useful for claims, framing and declared rules, not for facts.

• The July trigger, in their words: on 3 Jul the channel says air defences fired on Saudi jets trying to stop an Iranian civil flight landing at Sanaa. The 13 Jul Abha strike is framed as retaliation for the Sanaa runway strike, and the statement thanks Iran for helping lift the airport "siege". The Houthis themselves tie the escalation to the Tehran air bridge.
• Mecca: on 16 Sep, after Riyadh reported a drone toward Mecca, the channel denies targeting the city and says operations aim at oil and military sites.
• West coast: an 11 Sep summary says the offensive began on 3 Sep, covers six districts of Taiz and Hodeidah (5,400 km²) and has hit "7 divisions and 38 brigades".
• Saudi fire: on 24 Sep the channel claims more than 200 Saudi missiles fired from Jazan at Saada and Hajjah, and Sudanese as well as Yemeni casualties on the Saudi side.
• 8 Oct claims: two cruise missiles at Riyadh's King Khalid airport, one ballistic missile each at Najran airport and the Khamis Mushait air base.
• 9 Oct: humanitarian flights to and from Riyadh airport will be "permitted" if authorised by Sanaa's humanitarian coordination centre. The Houthis are asserting a veto over Saudi civil aviation, mirroring Riyadh's control of Sanaa's.
• 10 Oct: renewed warning that Saudi airports and airspace are a "theatre of operations", except Mecca and Medina, under an "airport for airport" equation. Saudi Arabia is told it bears responsibility for any "failed interceptions". War-media footage shows Shawaz loitering munitions against forces at Kahboub and al-Wazi'iya, near the strait.
• 11 Oct: four operations "with ballistic and cruise missiles and drones": Riyadh airport "in three phases since the evening before last" (which covers the 10 Oct Terminal 4 strike), Shedgum gas plant, Tanajib, and Dammam airport. Six ballistic missiles and two drones at Ras al-Ara and al-Saqiya in Lahij. "Locally manufactured" surface-to-air missiles said to turn back Saudi jets.
• Ground claims: a Lahij advance toward the strait repelled with 22 armoured vehicles destroyed (9 Oct); districts of Sama', al-Silw and al-Mawasit in Taiz "secured", with government fighters surrendering under an amnesty (10 Oct).

Saba, the Houthi news agency, reported on 12 Oct a Saudi strike on a house in Khab wal-Sha'af, al-Jawf, killing or wounding 16, mostly women and children (initial toll, Houthi government spokesman). Al-Masirah was blocked by the browser extension's safety settings and was not read.

A selective blockade, priced as one

JMIC rates the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden threat "substantial", the northern Red Sea "moderate", and names Saudi-linked vessels as highest risk; it expects non-Saudi traffic to keep using the lanes. The UN Secretary-General's report confirms three attacks through 5 August, all Saudi-linked or claimed as such. Only one Saudi-linked tanker transited after 20 July, per Lloyd's List.

• Winners. Saudi barrels moved north: Suez earned $505m in July, its best month since December 2023; the Suez Canal Authority expects $5.8–6bn for 2026.
• Credit. Saudi five-year CDS were 9 bps tighter year-to-date and below pre-conflict levels as of 24 Aug, before the September–October escalation. Tadawul fell 0.5% on 20 Sep after strikes near Riyadh. No reliable post-10 October market data was found.
• Oil. Brent was above $104 after the pipeline strike against about $72 before the war.

Inference. Credit has not priced the Saudi–Houthi war: the August CDS read predates it. A lethal strike on Yanbu terminals, not on airports, is the event most likely to reprice Saudi credit and the long-tanker trade.

Who is fighting the Houthis

Gap: two searches found no 2026 data on Saudi ground deployments on the border or Saudi naval dispositions in the Red Sea.

The Bab el-Mandeb shore, north to south

What the UN record adds

• Panel of Experts, S/2025/650 (17 Oct 2025): the best primary source on Houthi weapons, routes and finance used in this report. It notes the Panel lacked an arms expert and that 63% of its letters went unanswered.
• Resolution 2801 (14 Nov 2025): sanctions to 14 Nov 2026 and the Panel to 15 Dec 2026, adopted 13–0–2 with China and Russia abstaining. The US and France said it was too weak on interdiction.
• Secretary-General's monthly Red Sea report (S/2026/667, 10 Aug): independent confirmation of attacks on Encelia, NCC Ghazal and Daisy.
• 2026 Council record: Resolution 2826 (14 Jul) extends the monthly Red Sea reporting to 15 Jan 2027; UNMHA's Hodeidah mandate ended 31 Mar 2026 (Res 2813); emergency meeting on the west-coast offensive 15 Sep; press statement condemning Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia 18 Sep (SC/16458). The Panel's April 2026 advice on dual-use items and the September–October Red Sea reports were not found in public sources; the Panel advice may have gone only to the sanctions committee (unconfirmed).
• Council divisions: the US, Bahrain and Europeans condemn Iranian support; China and Russia call for a comprehensive Gulf and Gaza settlement.

Where sources disagree

Known, inferred, unknown, ahead

Indicators and falsifiers

Second- and third-order effects

• Energy. With Hormuz shut, the East–West pipeline and Yanbu are Saudi Arabia's outlet. A Yanbu terminal strike remains the unpriced escalation.
• Egypt. The selective blockade is a fiscal windfall for Cairo via Suez; a broad blockade would reverse it.
• Pakistan. The Mecca pact places Pakistani forces near a war Iran treats as strategic depth.
• Horn of Africa. Houthi links to al-Shabaab, refugee flows to Djibouti and Somalia, and the Eritrea–Ethiopia rupture put the strait's African shore in play.
• Compliance. FTO status raises exposure for shippers and traders touching Houthi ports; Mahan Air is already designated.

What this pass could and could not reach

Arabic coverage: coalition statements via QNA and SPA, Saree via Al Jazeera Arabic. Persian coverage: Euronews Persian, which quotes Iranian officials; Farsi state outlets (Tasnim, Mashregh, Entekhab) refused automated access. Iranian coverage: Press TV read directly (via its presstv.co.uk mirror). In the v3.1 browser pass, IRNA English, Tehran Times and Fars (Persian) were read in Chrome, as were Saba and Saree's Telegram channel. Tasnim returned an error page, a Fars article page rendered blank, and al-Masirah was blocked by the browser extension's safety settings. v4 read Saree's channel back to 3 July and pulled NASA FIRMS fire detections for 5–12 October; FIRMS' public files cover seven days, and earlier dates need its archive, which requires a registered key. Not reached: al-Masirah, Tasnim, ACLED, high-resolution satellite imagery, the Panel's April 2026 dual-use report. The fetch tool returns summaries rather than verbatim text, so figures are as reported by each page. Grades: A official, UN or physical evidence · B established outlet or wire · C party to the conflict, or an aggregator · D unsourced or tertiary.